CCR SURFACE IMPOUNDMENT

EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN

Plant McManus Ash Pond AP-1

I hereby certify that this Emergency Action Plan has been prepared in accordance with the requirements of 40 C.F.R. Part 257.73.

James C. Pegues, R.E. Licensed State of Georgia, P.E. N

ISSUE DATE: A

April 23, 2019

REVISION #:

1

REVISION RECORD

In accordance with 40 C.F.R. Part 257.73, this Emergency Action Plan (EAP) must be amended whenever there is a change in conditions that would substantially affect the EAP in effect. Additionally, the EAP must be evaluated, at a minimum, every five years to ensure the information is accurate. As necessary, this EAP must be updated and a revised EAP placed in the facility's operating record as required by 40 C.F.R. Part 257.105(f)(6).

Revision Number	Date	Sections Affected/Reason
0	10/16/18	Creation of Initial EAP
1	04/23/19	Added Hazard Potential Definitions to the Narrative

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CCR Coal Combustion Residuals

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

E&CS Engineering & Construction Services

EAP Emergency Action Plan

EMA Emergency Management Agency

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

FERC Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

GDOT Georgia Department of Transportation

GEMA Georgia Emergency Management Agency

GEOP Georgia Emergency Operations Plan

GPC Georgia Power Company

H:V Horizontal:Vertical

HDPE High-Density Polyethylene

ID Inside Diameter

SCS Southern Company Services

DEFINITIONS

Adverse Consequences. Negative impacts that may result from the failure of a dam. The primary concerns are loss of life, economic loss (including property damage), lifeline disruption and environmental impact.

Category I Dam. State of Georgia Safe Dams Program designation for Hazard Potential indicating that improper operation or failure would result in a probably loss of human life.

Category II Dam. State of Georgia Safe Dams Program designation for Hazard Potential indicating that improper operation or failure would not be expected to result in a probably loss of human life.

Coal Combustion Residuals (CCR). Fly ash, bottom ash, boiler slag, and flue gas desulfurization materials generated from burning coal for the purpose of generating electricity by electric utilities and independent power producers.

CCR Surface Impoundment. A natural topographic depression, man-made excavation, or diked area which is designed to hold an accumulation of CCR and liquids, and the unit treats, stores, or disposes of CCR.

Dam/Dike/Embankment. An embankment, berm, or ridge of either natural or man-made materials used to prevent the movement of liquids, sludges, solids, or other materials.

Dam Failure. Catastrophic type of failure characterized by the sudden, rapid and uncontrolled release of impounded water or the likelihood of such an uncontrolled release. It is recognized that there are lesser degrees of failure and that any malfunction or abnormality outside the design assumptions and parameters that adversely affect a dam's primary function of impounding water is properly considered a failure. These lesser degrees of failure can progressively lead to or heighten the risk of catastrophic failure. They are, however, normally amenable to corrective action.

Imminent Failure (Condition A Emergency). Failure of a dam/dike/embankment is imminent or has occurred.

Potential Failure (Condition B Emergency). A potential failure condition of a dam/dike/embankment is a developing condition, but adequate time is available to properly evaluate the problem and implement corrective actions that may alleviate or prevent failure.

Non-Failure Condition. A condition that will not, by itself, lead to a failure, but that requires investigation and notification of internal and/or external personnel.

Emergency. A condition that develops unexpectedly, endangers the structural integrity of the dam, and requires immediate action. An emergency can lead to Adverse Consequences in the event of Imminent Failure.

Filter. One or more layers of granular material graded so as to allow seepage through or within the layers while preventing the migration of material from adjacent zones.

Hazard Potential Classification. The possible adverse incremental consequences that result from the release of water or stored contents due to failure of the diked CCR surface impoundment or mis-operation of the diked CCR surface impoundment or its appurtenances. The hazard potential classifications include high hazard potential CCR impoundment, significant hazard potential CCR surface impoundment and low hazard CCR surface impoundment, which terms mean:

High hazard potential CCR surface impoundment means a diked surface impoundment where failure or mis-operation will probably cause loss of human life.

Low hazard potential CCR surface impoundment means a diked surface impoundment where failure or mis-operation results in no probable loss of human life and low economic and/or environmental losses. Losses are principally limited to the surface impoundment owner's property.

Significant hazard potential CCR surface impoundment means a diked surface impoundment where failure or mis-operation results in no probable loss of human life, but can cause economic loss, environmental damage, disruption of lifeline facilities or impact other concerns.

Inundation Map. A graphic representation of the inundation zone that shows the potential impact area due to a breach of the Ash Pond. The inundation maps in this procedure are based on a specific computer-modeled dam breach scenario; therefore, the boundaries depicted are estimates for that particular model. *The models are considered conservative but larger floods could potentially occur.* Please refer to Appendix B.

Inundation Zone. Area subject to flooding in the event of increased flows due to a dam/dike/embankment failure.

Piping. The progressive development of internal erosion of the dam/dike/embankment or foundation material by seepage.

Probable Maximum Flood. The flood that may be expected from the most severe combination of critical meteorologic and hydrologic conditions that are reasonably possible in the drainage basin.

Sunny Day Failure. A night or day failure that occurs during fair weather or when weather-related flooding is not occurring.

1.0 STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

This Emergency Action Plan (EAP) has been prepared for the Plant McManus Ash Pond AP-1 (AP-1) to meet the requirements of 40 C.F.R. Part 257.73(a)(3). The EAP identifies potential safety emergency conditions at the Plant McManus Ash Pond and specifies actions to be followed to minimize potential loss of life and property damage if such conditions exist.

This EAP will provide responding personnel with:

- Pertinent information and description related to Plant McManus AP-1;
- Definition of events or circumstances that represent a safety emergency;
- Procedures that will be followed to detect a safety emergency;
- Notification procedures in the event of a safety emergency;
- Information to assist in decision making;
- A list of responsible persons and their respective responsibilities;
- Provisions for an annual face-to-face meeting with local emergency responders;
- Contact information for emergency agencies and other emergency responders
- Contact information for additional resources and outside agencies; and
- Maps that delineate the downstream area that could be affected in the event of a failure.

2.0 FACILITY DESCRIPTION

The Clifford B. McManus Power Plant (Plant McManus) is located at One Crispen Island Drive in Brunswick, Georgia. Plant McManus was once a two-unit power generation facility. Construction of Unit 1 began in 1951 and the initial startup and commercial operation began in November 1952. Unit 1 was originally designed to operate as an oil-fired generator. Construction on Unit 2 began in 1957 and was declared commercial in 1959. Unit 2 was originally designed with coal as the primary fuel. Unit 1 was converted to coal in 1960. In 1971, both Units 1 and 2 were converted to oil-fired and the use of coal ceased after 1972. Units 1 and 2 have been retired and demolished as of 2017.

AP-1 was constructed in 1957 to receive and store coal combustion residuals and process water produced by Units 1 and 2 during the electric power generating process at Plant McManus. AP-1 has not received ash since 1972 but continued to support plant operations with low volume waste treatment. AP-1 is in the process of being closed through removal of the CCR from the CCR unit. As of March 2018, approximately 60% of the CCR has been removed. AP-1 is dewatered as required to facilitate excavation of ash for removal. All CCR is being excavated, transported, and disposed of in an offsite Solid Waste permitted landfill. Ash removal activities are anticipated to be completed 2nd Quarter 2019.

AP-1 encompasses approximately 80 acres as shown in Figure 1. AP-1 was constructed by placing an embankment (dam) across an upland marsh area in the northeast corner of the plant property. The primary and secondary spillway are intact and located west of the dam. During ash pond closure, accumulated water is managed by a temporary water treatment system in accordance with a dewatering plan approved by the Georgia Environmental Protection Division. The treated water is then discharged via the NPDES permitted outfall located at the primary spillway. When discharged, the treated water is sampled and monitored in accordance with the approved dewatering plan.

The AP-1 dam is an exempt structure as defined by the Georgia Department of Natural Resources – Environmental Protection Division – Safe Dams Program (Georgia Safe Dams Program). The Georgia Safe Dams Program does not inventory or regulate dams with an exempt classification.

AP-1 has been assigned a Significant Hazard Potential classification under 40 C.F.R. Part 257.73 of the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Coal Combustion Residuals (CCR) Rule. A significant hazard classification, by definition, indicates that structural failure or misoperation of the CCR unit would result in no probable loss of human life but could potentially result in economic loss and/or environmental damage.

A failure of the dam at AP-1 would inundate the salt water marsh and areas near the dam. There are no other dams located downstream of AP-1 that would be impacted by its failure. The limits of potential flooding in the event of failure of the AP-1 dam can be seen on the Inundation Maps, which are included as Appendix B. The provided inundation maps were developed based on the results of routing the breach wave downstream using the computer software, HEC-RAS. HEC-RAS is a general application one-dimensional hydraulic model that can perform unsteady flow routing through an open channel system that may also include culverts, bridges, levees, tributaries, storage areas, and other dams. Unsteady flow analyses allow for flow conditions that vary temporally and spatially such as a dam breach simulation. Breach parameters such as failure time, breach width, and breach side slopes were selected from industry accepted empirical

formulas. Water surface elevation data was extracted from the hydraulic model and plotted on best available LiDAR topographic information for the downstream areas.

Normal water levels and the flow from simulated dam breaches were superimposed over topographical maps to identify areas subject to flooding. These flood extents are provided for planning purposes only; actual flooding can vary due to actual conditions present at the time of the failure.

3.0 DETECTION, EVALUATION, AND CLASSIFICATION PROCEDURES FOR EMERGENCIES

3.1 Inspection Schedule and Condition Detection/Evaluation

Trained personnel from Plant McManus inspect the AP-1 dam on a regular basis to preemptively detect conditions, in a timely manner that could indicate a potential issue so that it can be addressed. Personnel from the Plant's Operations group perform weekly inspections; and SCS E&CS Fossil Dam Safety (Fossil Dam Safety) personnel perform an annual inspection. The dam is also inspected daily as part of the closure contractor's quality control practices and is periodically inspected by E&CS construction personnel.

Plant personnel conducting inspections of the dams are trained on an annual basis by engineers from Fossil Dam Safety on the appropriate surveillance and monitoring requirements.

Any issues discovered during an inspection are reported to Fossil Dam Safety as prescribed in the Safety Procedure for Dams and Dikes at Fossil Generation Plants (GEN10004). The Fossil Dam Safety Engineer(s) working with plant personnel will recommend a corrective course of action, as needed.

There is no dam monitoring instrumentation located at AP-1.

3.2 Condition Severity Classifications

AP-1 dam emergencies will be classified based on the type of event, severity of the situation, and the time required to take corrective measures. This procedure covers the following severity classifications:



NON-FAILURE CONDITION (NFC)

A situation that will not, by itself, lead to a failure and is not considered an emergency. However, and NFC does require investigation and notification of Fossil Dam Safety personnel and may require corrective action.

POTENTIAL FAILURE – Condition B Emergency (B)

A developing situation where failure of a dam may occur but implementation of pre-planned actions may alleviate or prevent failure. In general, adequate time is considered available to properly evaluate and implement corrective actions. Should conditions worsen, an Imminent Failure emergency may be declared.

IMMINENT FAILURE – Condition A Emergency (A)

A situation where failure of the dam is imminent or has already occurred.

3.3 Guidance for Determining the Condition Severity Level

The following table details potential situations that could occur at the AP-1 dam. The Condition Level indicated in the right-most column corresponds with the Condition Severity Classifications in Section 3.2 above.

Event	Situation	Emergency Level						
	AP-1 water surface elevation at auxiliary spillway crest or spillway is flowing with no active erosion	NFC						
A:1:	Auxiliary spillway flowing with active gully erosion	В						
Auxiliary Spillway Flow	Auxiliary Spillway flow that could result in flooding of people downstream if the AP-1 level continues to rise							
FIOW	Auxiliary Spillway flowing with an advancing headcut that is threatening the control section							
	Auxiliary Spillway flow that is flooding people downstream	A						
	AP-1 level is 1 foot below the top of the dam	В						
Embankment Overtopping*	Water from AP-1 is flowing over the top of the dam	A						
Overtopping	Storm related tidal surge from upstream side of dam	В						
	New seepage areas in or near the dam	NFC						
Seepage	New seepage areas with cloudy discharge or increasing flow rate	В						
	Seepage with discharge greater than 10 gallons per minute	A						
Dropouts/	Observation of new dropouts or depressions in AP-1 or on the dam	В						
Depressions	Rapidly enlarging dropout or depression							
Embankment	New cracks in the embankment greater than ½-inch wide without seepage							
Cracking	Cracks in the dam with seepage	В						
Embankment	Visual movement/slippage of the dam slopes	NFC						
Movement	Sudden or rapidly proceeding slides of the dam slopes	A						
Instruments	Instrumentation readings beyond predetermined/historic values	NFC						
	Measurable earthquake felt or reported on or within 50 miles of the dam	NFC						
Earthquake	Earthquake resulting in visible damage to the dam or its appurtenances	В						
	Earthquake resulting in uncontrolled release of water from the dam	A						
Security	Verified bomb threat that, if carried out, could result in damage to the dam	В						
Threat	Detonated bomb that has resulted in damage to the dam or its appurtenances	A						
	Damage to dam or its appurtenances that could adversely impact the functioning of the dam	NFC						
Sabotage /	Modification to the dam or its appurtenances that could adversely impact the functioning of the dam	NFC						
Vandalism	Damage to dam or its appurtenances that has resulted in seepage flow	В						
	Damage to the dam or its appurtenances that has resulted in uncontrolled water release	A						

^{*}Does not include normal tidal fluctuations upstream of dam.

4.0 INCIDENT RESPONSE

The following situations and conditions should be evaluated when performing condition severity detections and evaluations.

Overtopping. AP-1 consists of an 80-acre storage area. The inflow design flood consists of the rainfall that falls within the limits of the surface impoundment and runoff from 68.1 acres of adjoining watershed. Stormwater is temporarily stored within the limits of AP-1 and discharged through a primary spillway. The primary spillway is a 4-foot-tall x 8-foot-wide rectangular concrete channel with a 120° "V"-notch spillway. The primary spillway channel discharges into Burnette Creek, a brackish water tributary to the Turtle River. The pond incorporates an auxiliary spillway that is not engaged until rainfall exceeds the 1,000-year design storm.

Seepage. Failures due to internal erosion and/or piping resulting from seepage would be detected in the early stages during the regular inspections conducted by plant personnel. Inspectors are trained to look for evidence of seepage. Inspection reports are transmitted to trained dam safety engineers for evaluation. Therefore, the conditions that could lead to failures of this type would likely be discovered and corrected, making an actual failure a remote possibility.

Slope Instability. Slope instability would be demonstrated by sloughing of dam/dike slopes, which would be detected by plant or construction personnel in their inspections. The conditions that could potentially lead to a failure of this type would also be detected in advance and corrected making an actual failure a remote possibility.

In the event that conditions are detected that could potentially lead to a dam failure, the flowcharts in Appendices C (Incident Response) and D (Response Notification) will be used to respond to the situation and alert applicable personnel and emergency agencies. In that situation, local emergency management agencies (EMAs) would respond and begin warnings and evacuations as soon as possible following the declaration of a safety emergency.

4.1 Access to the Site

Plant personnel are able to access the dam from the north by paved and unpaved roadways from the western end of Hickory Point Road and access the dam from the south by paved or gravel-surfaced roadways from the main portion of Plant McManus at the south end of Crispen Boulevard. Figures 1 and 2 show the location of AP-1 on Plant property.

4.2 Response during Periods of Darkness

Plant McManus is operational and/or manned 24 hours a day every day, and personnel and equipment will be able to access the site at any time. Response times would not vary significantly from daylight conditions.

4.3 Response during Weekends and Holidays

Plant McManus is operational and/or manned 24 hours a day every day, and personnel and equipment will be able to access the site at any time. The response times of certain personnel

may be affected, but 24-hour contact information is included in the EAP for responsible personnel.

4.4 Response during Adverse Weather

The dam is accessed by paved and gravel-surfaced roads and is accessible during periods of adverse weather. Response times are not expected to be greatly affected by severe flooding.

5.0 RESPONSIBLE PERSONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Designated personnel have been trained in the use of these response procedures and are aware of their responsibilities in making the procedures effective. The chain of command and the individual responsibilities for plant personnel, public officials, and agencies are outlined below.

5.1 Plant Manager

The Plant Manager is ultimately responsible for the content, effectiveness, and implementation of the response procedures. The Plant Manager normally serves as the Incident Commander or designates this person. *Plant Managers have the authority and responsibility to direct all on-site activities*.

The Plant Manager or his designee will assess the conditions, direct the corrective and protective measures necessary to mitigate the condition(s), and, if necessary, declare an emergency condition. The Plant Manager or his designee will also declare the termination of an emergency condition. Once outside agencies are notified, the Plant Manager or his designee is responsible for keeping EMA informed of any changes in conditions. See Incident Commander responsibilities for further details.

5.2 Duty Officer

The Duty Officer is the 24-hour point of contact for all plant emergencies. If the Plant Manager is unavailable and the Duty Officer is on-site, he/she will assume the duties and responsibilities of the Incident Commander until properly relieved by the Plant Manager or other designee.

5.3 Incident Commander

The Plant Manager or his designee is the Incident Commander. If neither is available, Operations Shift Team Leader or the Duty Officer will assume the duties and responsibilities of the Incident Commander until properly relieved by the Plant Manager or ranking member of the Management Team.

The Incident Commander is responsible for:

- 1. Verifying that an emergency condition exists.
- 2. Assessing and declaring the emergency condition.
- 3. Consulting with Fossil Dam Safety to evaluate conditions and determine remediation actions.
- 4. Emergency Actions
 - a. If necessary, implement actions to lower the water level in the impoundment in consultation with Fossil Dam Safety.
 - b. Call-out of personnel necessary to perform the work required on plant site during the emergency.
- 5. Ensure the notification process as outlined in the Response Notification Flowchart (Appendix D) is completed in an expedient manner.

- 6. Other responsibilities include:
 - a. Establishing lines of communication from the plant to the local and state EMAs.
 - b. Ensuring emergency sources of power are available for the operation of essential equipment such as emergency lighting.
 - c. Ensuring the availability of heavy equipment and trained operators to aid in the mitigation effort.

5.4 Plant Security Department

The Plant Security Department is responsible for securing company property and controlling access to company facilities. The Plant Security Department will inform the Incident Commander who will perform emergency notifications to Plant Environmental Compliance, the Georgia System Operator, and outside agencies as shown on Response Notification Flowchart (Appendix D). This consists of local and state EMAs. **These notifications are mandatory when an emergency condition has been declared by the Plant Manager or Incident Commander.**

5.5 Plant Environmental Compliance

Environmental Compliance personnel are responsible for assessing conditions, contacting the Plant Manager, obtaining assistance from Fossil Dam Safety, and for providing technical updates to the Emergency Coordinator. Compliance personnel can also request assistance from GPC Environmental Affairs.

5.6 Georgia System Operator

The Georgia System Operator contacts the National Weather Service to inform them of conditions at the plant that may lead to potential flooding downstream.

5.7 Fossil Dam Safety

Fossil Dam Safety is responsible for coordinating and providing the technical support necessary to mitigate the emergency condition and for notifying the Hydro Services General Manager of the emergency condition. Fossil Dam Safety shall also notify GPC Supply Chain Management and the Georgia Safe Dams Program as shown on the Response Notification Flowchart (Appendix D).

5.8 GPC Personnel

Environmental Affairs

GPC Environmental Affairs is responsible for coordinating long-term environmental response (after the initial response) and to remediate environmental issues and provide the technical support necessary for any remediation needs. Environmental Affairs is also responsible for all communications with environmental regulatory agencies for appropriate reporting of releases to the environment and for securing variances to existing permits, if needed.

If necessary, Environmental Affairs will also help secure approved remediation contractors for the specific emergency condition that may exist. They will also provide additional support, such as emergency manpower, material, equipment, and expertise to assist in mitigation efforts, if needed.

Corporate Communications

GPC Corporate Communications is responsible for coordinating the GPC media response and will schedule news briefings and prepare news releases, as required. GPC Corporate Communications will also work with local and State Public Information Officers to ensure that timely, accurate, and consistent information is made available to media outlets.

Corporate Security

GPC Corporate Security is responsible for supporting Plant Security personnel and contracting with local law enforcement for additional security personnel as needed.

Supply Chain Management

Supply Chain Management is responsible for obtaining additional equipment and materials necessary to mitigate the emergency condition and begin the recovery process.

5.9 Emergency Agencies

Local EMAs are responsible for planning and implementing evacuation and sheltering plans as well as directing search, rescue, and recovery efforts. If additional resources are required, the local agencies can contact the Georgia Emergency Management Agency (GEMA) for assistance.

The local EMAs are the point of contact between plant personnel and local jurisdictions. The EMAs are responsible for the direction and control of emergency operations at the local level and keeping local government officials informed of the status of emergency operations.

GEMA generally becomes involved in an emergency situation if the local agencies are not capable of handling the situation or if assistance is requested by a local agency or by the Governor. Refer to the "Georgia Emergency Operations Plan" (GEOP) for an explanation of specific functions. GEMA has responsibilities similar to the local EMAs but is also responsible for mobilizing state military support as well as State Disaster Center operations.

5.10 Law Enforcement

Local Law Enforcement agencies are notified by the appropriate EMA. GEMA notifies the State Patrol as well as the Georgia Department of Transportation (GDOT). Law Enforcement is responsible for traffic control and can assist with evacuation, mitigation, and rescue activities.

6.0 NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES

Communication during an emergency event will primarily be by company phone. In the event of system failure, Southern Linc radios and cell phones would be utilized as an alternate method of communication. These numbers are listed on the Response Notification Flowchart located in Appendix D.

Local and state EMA will be notified in the event of an emergency, and these agencies will be responsible for notifying the public. In the event of an imminent failure, local and state EMA's will be notified to immediately begin evacuation procedures. GPC Corporate Communications will provide information for media outlets and will be responsible for communicating relevant information to the public.

6.1 Incident Response Flowchart for Imminent Failure and Potential Failure Emergencies

This Procedure and the following Incident Response Flowchart (below in text and in Appendix C in visual) for Imminent Failure and Potential Failure Emergencies shall be posted at appropriate locations at Plant McManus. Personnel responsible for executing mitigation and/or emergency actions shall be thoroughly familiar with their responsibilities under this EAP.

- A. When a Condition B or Condition A situation is detected, notify plant personnel in accordance with the Incident Response Flowchart (below and in Appendix C). Plant Environmental Compliance should contact Fossil Dam Safety immediately for technical consultation. Fossil Dam Safety will provide the evaluation of the conditions and provide a determination if there is an immediate threat to the dam/dike. If there is an immediate threat of dam/dike or dike failure, declare an **Imminent Failure Emergency** and proceed to Step I.
- B. If no immediate threat is detected, determine if the problem detected could possibly lead to failure of the dam/dike. If there is a potential for failure but corrective measures may be taken to moderate or alleviate failure, declare a **Potential Failure Emergency** (Condition B) and proceed to Step C.
- C. If a **Potential Failure Emergency** has been declared, notify personnel and agencies listed on the Response Notification Flowchart (Appendix D). Document all communications using the appropriate forms contained in Appendix E. Once outside agencies have been notified of an issue or potential problem, plant management is responsible for keeping local EMAs informed of any change in conditions.
- D. Begin corrective measures to attempt to alleviate or prevent failure.
- E. Evaluate the effectiveness of the corrective measures. If the corrective actions are successful, update all personnel/agencies previously contacted of the status of the improved conditions and document relevant communications using the forms provided in Appendix E. At this time, the Emergency Coordinator will end the emergency condition. Fossil Dam Safety will be responsible for preparing the after-action report.

- F. If the corrective measures are not effective, Fossil Dam Safety will determine if there is time to take additional corrective measures.
- G. If there is not time to take additional corrective measures and failure is imminent, declare an **Imminent Failure Emergency** (Condition A) and proceed to Step I.
- H. If there is time to implement additional corrective measures, return to Step E. Additional support can be requested from Civil Field Services or outside contractors, as needed.
- I. If an **Imminent Failure Emergency** has been declared by the Plant Manager or his designee, ensure that all personnel have been moved to a safe area and perform notifications per the Response Notification Flowchart (Appendix D). Document all communications using the appropriate forms contained in Appendix E. Once outside agencies have been notified of a problem or potential problem, the Plant Manager or his designee is responsible for keeping local EMAs informed of any change in conditions. Fossil Dam Safety will be responsible for preparing the after-action report.

6.2 Additional Considerations

All communication shall be documented using the *Data Recording Sheet* located in Appendix E.

7.0 PROVISIONS FOR ANNUAL COORDINATION MEETING


An annual face-to-face meeting will be held with representatives of Plant McManus, GPC, and the emergency response agencies described in this plan. These emergency response agencies may include:


- Glynn County Emergency Management Agency
- Georgia Emergency Management Agency
- Glynn County Sheriff's Department
- Georgia Environmental Protection Division Safe Dams Program


APPENDIX A

Plant McManus Location Map – Figure 1 Ash Pond AP-1 Overview – Figure 2









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FIGURE 1

PLANT McMANUS LOCATION MAP GLYNN COUNTY, GEORGIA

Southern Company Generation Engineering and Construction Services FOR

Georgia Power Company

SCALE	DRAWING NUMBER	SHEET	CONT'D	REV
AS SHOWN		1	FINAL	0










job, safely.											Copyright © 2018 Southern Company Services, Inc. All Rights Reserved This document contains proprietary, confidential, and/or trade secret information of the Southern Company or of third parties. It is intended for use only by employees of, or authorized contractors of, the subsidiaries of the Southern Company. Unauthorized possession, use, distribution, copying, dissemination, or disclosure of any portion hereof is prohibited.	Southern Company Generation Engineering and Construction Services FOR					
ر کے کہ day, even											FIGURE 2	G	eorgia Power Co	mpa	ny		
Every											PLANT McMANUS ASH POND AP-1 OVERVIEW GLYNN COUNTY, GEORGIA	SCALE	DRAWING NUMBER	SHEET	CONT'D	REV	
	REV	DATE	DESCRIPTION	BY	CHK'D	CIVIL APPR	ELECT APPR	I/C APPR	MECH APPR	DISC MGR	·	AS SHOWN		1	FINAL	0	





Inundation Maps





























Response Notification Flowchart

Imminent Failure or Potential Failure Emergencies
Fossil Dam Safety Notifications





Data Recording Sheet

EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN DATA RECORDING SHEET

The Data Recording Sheet will be u	used to record important information relating to dam safety emergency.
Team Member(s):	
Date of Incident:	
Time of Incident:	
Type of Emergency:	
Emergency Coordinator:	
Description of Events.*	
What is Being Done:*	
*Attach additional pages as necessary.	
For incoming questions, refer all	calls to:
Media Inquiries:	Georgia Power Company Corporate Communications See Response Notification Flowchart for phone numbers.
EMA Inquiries:	Plant Manager/Emergency Coordinator
Environmental Agency Inquiries:	GPC Environmental Affairs



Instructions for the Construction of an Emergency Reverse Filter

EMERGENCY REVERSE FILTER CONSTRUCTION

The purpose of the reverse filter is to slow down the flow of water in order to reduce the ability of the water to carry soil particles. The size of the soil particle that a flow of water can carry is a function of the 3rd power of the velocity of the flow. The slower the velocity, the less soil the water can carry. The other function of the filter is to trap soil particles before they exit.

The usual components of a reverse filter are as follows:

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GDOT washed #10 sand (10NS)
# 89 stone
# 57 stone
GDOT Type 3 rip rap
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These materials should be stockpiled in a location where they can easily and quickly be moved to the seepage site. Two truckloads of each type of material should be stored in a convenient location that is out of the way. It is best if they are located so that a backhoe or front end loader can pick them up and transfer them directly to the seepage site. Transport schemes that require multiple vehicles and multiple operators are usually impossible to implement at night or on weekends. The stockpiles should be labeled "Granular Filter Stockpile – Emergency Use Only" to keep them from being appropriated for other purposes by those unaware of their purpose.

To build a reverse filter over a boil or area of concentrated seepage, follow the directions below. A cross section of the reverse filter construction is provided on the next page.

- 1) Clear loose material from around the site.
- 2) Place 6" of #10 washed sand over the area of concern, and extend it for at least 12" beyond the seepage limits.
- 3) Place 6" of #89 stone over the sand, and extend it for at least 6" beyond the sand.
- 4) Place 6" of #57 stone over the sand, and extend it for at least 6" beyond the #89 stone.
- 5) If necessary to stabilize the #57 stone, place rip rap on top of the #57 stone. Conditions that may make the rip rap necessary are anticipated surface flows that might wash away the filter or increasing seepage flows that may try to shift the lighter filter materials.

If the flow is too fast for the sand to remain in place, a layer of #57 stone or GDOT Type 3 rip rap may be placed over the boil to slow the flow down. This is followed by a layer of #89 stone, then the sand, and then the #89, #57 and rip rap in succession.

Sometimes a seep will pop out on the edge of a newly applied filter. In this case, it is generally necessary to apply the granular filter as a blanket to the general area rather than as a spot treatment. The layers are as described above but will cover a larger area.

Filter fabric or geotextile is not acceptable as a substitute for the sand. The fabric tends to smear and clog if applied in a wet situation.

CROSS SECTION OF A REVERSE FILTER OVER A SEEP OR BOIL

